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Abstract
Background: This paper addresses an important practical challenge to staff management. In 2000
the United Nations committed themselves to the ambitious targets embodied in the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). Only five years later, it was clear that poor countries were not on
track to achieve them. It was also clear that achieving the three out of the eight MDGs that concern
health would only be possible if the appropriate human resources (HR) were in place.
Methods: We use a case study based on semi-structured interview data to explore the steps that
Namibia, a country facing severe health problems that include an alarmingly high AIDS infection
rate, has taken to manage its health workers.
Results: In the fifteen years since independence, Namibia has patiently built up a relatively good
strategic framework for health policy in the context of government policy as a whole, including
strong training arrangements at every level of health staffing, and it has brought HIV/AIDS under
the strategic umbrella through its National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS. Its major weakness is that
it has not kept pace with the rise in HIV/AIDS and TB infection: the community counselling service,
still at the pilot stage at the time of this study, was the only specific response. That has created a
tension between building long-term capacity in a strategic context and responding to the short-
term demands of the AIDS and TB crisis, which in turn affects the ability of HR to contribute to
improving health outcomes.
Conclusion: It is suggested that countries like Namibia need a new paradigm for staffing their
health services. Building on the existing strategic framework, it should target the training of 'mid-
level cadres'. Higher-level cadres should take on the role of supporting and monitoring the mid-
level cadres. To do that, they will need management training and a performance management
framework for staff support and monitoring.
Background: institutional and HR capacity
Was it realistic for the United Nations to set a target for
reducing maternal mortality by three-quarters? For that,
along with ambitious targets for child mortality and dis-
ease reduction, is what Namibia, the focus of this article,
and every other government committed themselves to
when they signed the United Nations' Millennium Decla-
ration in September 2000. Reducing child and maternal
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mortality by 2015, and also the deadly diseases of HIV/
AIDS, malaria and TB, is the thrust of three of the eight
'Millennium Development Goals' (MDGs). The Millen-
nium Declaration represents a new direction for develop-
ment thinking, departing from the 'big private sector and
small state' model that was dominant in the 1980s and for
most of the 1990s.
Nevertheless, five years on from the Declaration, the UN's
own status report showed that little progress on the health
Goals had been made in sub-Saharan Africa. Rates of child
and maternal mortality, and likewise of malaria and TB
infection, all remained stubbornly high – the TB rate was
actually increasing. With measles immunization rates
staying low and an HIV/AIDS infection rate that was sta-
bilizing but not falling (which in practice meant a grow-
ing number of people succumbing to full-blown AIDS),
sub-Saharan Africa was worse off than anywhere else in
the world [1].
The causes are complex, and beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. But it is clear that national governments will have to
play the leading role in any solution. The 'small state'
which has divested or privatized many of its functions is
unequal to the task. In fact, the need for governments to
take a lead, particularly in the fight against HIV/AIDS, is
the very first argument that Francis Fukuyama [2]
advances in his recent book State Building to persuade his
readers, especially in the United States, that the state is
fundamentally a good rather than a bad thing, and that we
need to strengthen the capacity of weak states rather than
cut strong but predatory ones down to size. Treating AIDS,
Fukuyama points out, requires a robust public health
infrastructure and comprehensive public education. Even
if poor countries need help to tackle the problem, they
also need institutional capacity of their own, if for no
other reason than to channel the resources that might
come from outside.
It is also clear, as other contributors to this journal have
pointed out, that the way governments manage their
health workers is an important part of their institutional
capacity. While the budgetary imperative to rein back
spending on staff hasn't gone away, we have started to
hear a different story in the health sphere from the down-
sizing narrative that dominated discussion in the 1980s
and 1990s, a story about the positive contribution of
health workers to public health, rather than their negative
drain on public expenditure. For example, we have real-
ized that the more doctors, nurses and midwives there are,
the lower maternal, infant and child mortality rates will
be [3,4].
Yet despite what we know about the potential contribu-
tion of health workers, their actual contribution is woeful.
One reason why sub-Saharan Africa is so far from meeting
the UN's 2005 Millennium Development Goals for health
(which deal with reducing child mortality, improving
maternal health and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases) is that while Africa is estimated to have
25% of the world's diseases, it has only 1.3% of its health
staff [1,5]. In spite of dramatic scaling-up of plans –
Malawi, to take one example, was planning at the time of
writing for a twenty-fold increase in Anti-Retroviral Ther-
apy (ART), a crucial component of AIDS treatment – the
World Health Organization (WHO) was obliged to admit
that it would not reach its own '3 by 5' target of giving
AIDS drugs to three million people in developing coun-
tries by the end of 2005, and staff shortage was again one
of the reasons it gave [6]. Botswana's estimate that intro-
ducing ART would require 29% more doctors and 8%
more nurses than it already had – and no less than 179%
more pharmacists – gives an idea of the size of the HR task
[7].
It was against this background that Dovlo [8] proposed
equipping 'mid-level cadres' to do the work of high-level
staff who are a premium, and Wyss [5] proposed the fol-
lowing in his review of the HR implications of the MDGs:
• Recruit more staff from underrepresented groups and
regions
• Distribute staff better across rural and urban areas
• Improve performance management
• Improve training
• Improve the policy framework
However, the reality is that while demand for health staff
is increasing, the supply is decreasing, and will decrease
further if current trends continue. One reason is the 'brain
drain' of skilled staff going abroad or moving from the
public to the private sector [9]. The OECD estimated in
2002 that no fewer than six out of every hundred health
workers in the UK were South Africans [10]. What point
was there, for example, in South Africa planning to create
12 000 new health posts when it already had 29 000 that
it couldn't fill? Moreover, health worker numbers in Africa
have often not kept up with population growth, not least
because of the 'downsizing' cutbacks, which made little
distinction between health staff and staff in other govern-
ment activities which are less of a priority and where there
might still be scope for reducing numbers.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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Study aims
In the light of the above discussion, this article will ana-
lyse the way the Namibian health service manages its staff,
focusing on two questions:
• How congruent is staff management with the emerging
health care needs that have been outlined above?
• What account is taken of professional 'good practice' in
human resource management?
The reason for posing the first question should be self-
explanatory in the light of our discussion so far (and,
indeed, in the light of the interests of most readers of this
journal). The reason for posing the second question is
given in the section on 'methods' below.
The Namibian health service
Namibia has been chosen as a suitable case for exploring
the aims of this study because its health service is seen as
having done well in providing basic public health facili-
ties and managing its staff, reflected in health indicators
that are relatively good in regional terms. In some ways it
is not a typical sub-Saharan country. The World Bank clas-
sifies it as upper-middle income, largely because of its
mineral wealth, and it has a small population of just
under two million despite its large area, much of which is
desert. Roads and other parts of the infrastructure are very
good. But in other ways it is typical. Namibia's human
development, at 126th out of 177 countries in 2004, is
low, partly because the health of a large section of the
population is closer to poorer countries in Africa than
national averages suggest. That in turn reflects the apart-
heid legacy of income inequality and a skewed provision
of services. There are also serious gaps in the health infra-
structure. Namibia is one of six African countries which
have no graduate medical school of their own, so doctors
have to be trained abroad or imported [11]. At ministry
level there are vestiges of top-down management and
bureaucratic habits, as we shall see in the findings pre-
sented below.
But the most alarming thing that Namibia has in common
with its poor neighbours, and the reason why Namibia's
HDI rating is not only low but in relative decline, is the
level of HIV/AIDS and TB infection. In 2003 it was esti-
mated that 210 000 people were living with HIV/AIDS,
more than one in ten of the population; only Namibia's
southern African neighbours – Botswana, Lesotho, South
Africa and Swaziland – had higher rates [12]. Knock-on
effects included HIV infection of health workers, with
prevalence among ante-natal attendants of 8.4 per cent as
early as the mid-1990s. The TB infection rate, at 676 for
every 100 000 people, was the highest in the world. More-
over, over 45% of TB sufferers were also HIV positive, as
TB is the most serious of the opportunistic infections to
which HIV carriers are liable to fall victim. As a result, life
expectancy, which had been 60 years in 1991, had
dropped to 42 by 2002.
Even the relatively sound health infrastructure is creaking
under the weight of these problems, as again we shall see
in the findings presented below. The precipitous rise in
HIV/AIDS and TB has created a dilemma in health strategy
and staffing. Unlike some other countries in the region,
Namibia has made steady progress in realizing a long-
term strategic vision for health care, as we shall see. But its
relatively settled structure, an achievement that should
not be taken for granted, is now in tension with the need
for an urgent response which matches the scale of the HIV
and TB crisis. That tension is one of the principal themes
of this article.
Methods
Research framework
The research framework derives from HR professional
'good practice'. Its principal element is the strategic
human resource management (SHRM) model, which is
the dominant model among HR specialists, as almost any
recent textbook will show. Also, three HR activities have
been selected which can be regarded as the building
blocks of that model, as well as being prominent in the
everyday practice of staff management.
Strategic human resource management
The SHRM model, which by now is extensively docu-
mented on both sides of the Atlantic [13-15], is the main
theoretical model on which the study rests. Its principal
element is the notion of strategic integration, which refers
to aligning staff management systems with organizations'
overall strategic objectives (vertical integration) and with
each other (horizontal integration).
Strategic integration implicitly changes the HR specialist's
relationship with line managers. The specialist is sup-
posed to design the HR systems that will align with strate-
gic objectives, while the manager is supposed to carry
them out. Guest [15] observes that almost all writers say
that HR must be managed by line managers: 'HRM,' he
says, 'Is too important to be left to the personnel manag-
ers.' Thus at the strategic level this study concentrates on
the twin questions of 'strategic integration' and 'line man-
ager ownership' of HR. (Line manager ownership is equiv-
alent to what the public management and development
literatures call 'administrative deconcentration' or 'mana-
gerial devolution'.)
Thus this study operationalizes the SHRM model through
two elements: strategic integration and line manager own-
ership. But we will not confine ourselves to the strategicHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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level. We will also focus on three HR activities: employee
selection; performance management and appraisal; and
training. We have chosen the first two because:
1. There is good evidence for their effect on organizational
performance. The evidence for employee selection is par-
ticularly robust and of very long standing [16]. The evi-
dence for performance management, although oblique –
it concerns the effect of objective setting and feedback on
performance, both central features of performance man-
agement [17] – is also robust.
2. There is evidence from previous studies of substantial
and interesting national differences in the practice of per-
formance management [18]. Objections from Japan are
well known. Companies there prefer to see the team as the
unit of production rather than the individual as perform-
ance management tends to do [19]. In Europe, Denmark
stands out as a country whose democratic workplace rela-
tions have held performance management at bay [20].
Our third HR activity, training is also an inherently impor-
tant element of HR practice. However, there are also spe-
cific reasons for focusing on it in the Namibian health
service, as we hope will become clear in the discussion
below.
Interview details
The authors gathered data from the headquarters of the
Ministry of Health, but also from the central ministries
that are 'above' them and from hospitals, clinics and a
regional headquarters that are 'below'. Twenty-two semi-
structured interviews based on the research framework
were held in May and June 2005. The people we inter-
viewed, identified by current and former HR staff in the
Ministry of Health and Social Services as carrying a key
responsibility for the design of operation of HRM systems,
were:
• Two officials in the Department of Public Service Man-
agement in the Office of the Prime Minister
• Three officials in the Department of State Accounts in
the Ministry of Finance
• The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Health and
Social Services
• The Under Secretary of the Department of Policy Devel-
opment and Resource Management, the Department
responsible for HR in the Ministry of Health)
• Three current and former officials in the above depart-
ment
• Staff involved in health training programmes in the Uni-
versity of Namibia
• Staff in the National Health Training Centre, both cen-
tral and regional
• Managers in a regional health administration
• Managers at Katatura hospital, Windhoek
• Staff in the (USAID-funded) Centers for Disease Control
(CDC)
• Staff in two other international agencies active in the
health field.
We also ran three focus groups of more junior staff at a
central hospital and two clinics, one in the capital and one
in a regional headquarters.
Results
Strategic human resource management
One of the most successful features of the Namibian
health service is that it is a relatively well integrated sys-
tem, not only within the Ministry of Health but across
government as a whole, as Figure 1 shows.
The foundation document is Namibia's 'Vision 2030'
[16]. It is not unique to Namibia: it derives ultimately
Figure 1
Overall government policy, including the National Development Plan 
È
Health policy, including HR planning for health 
È
Health institutions: the Ministry, districts and training institutions 
È
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from Malaysia's well-known 'Vision 2020', and both Bot-
swana and Lesotho in the region have versions of their
own. One level below it is the National Development Plan
process; Namibia is now in the period of its second Plan
(2001–2006]. One level below that again is health policy.
The basic framework was laid down in 1990 at the time of
independence in Towards achieving health for all Namibians:
A policy statement, which the government reviewed in
1997. The thrust of health policy is reflected in the five-
year Human resource strategic plan 2000/1–2004/5. There is
also a 'Public Service Charter' for government as a whole,
modelled on the 'Charter for the Public Service in Africa' (in
which Namibia played a leading role) and ultimately on
the UK's 'Citizen's Charters'. It sets out standards of behav-
iour, including courtesy to clients, to which public serv-
ants should cleave. There is also written evidence of
'strategic integration', in the sense of a fit between overall
strategy and the way that staff are managed: HR issues do
get addressed in the context of strategic programmes.
There are, for example, sections on HR in both the
National strategic plan on HIV/AIDS 2004–2009 and the
Guidelines for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of
HIV (PMTC).
Such documents have their limitations. Experts on strate-
gic management and project planning like Mintzberg [17]
and Korten [18] have long emphasized that it is the qual-
ity of strategic thinking, rather than the content of strate-
gic documents with their inevitably short shelf-life, that is
crucial: 'blueprint project' designs are usually more
impressive on paper than in practice. The full 30-year HR
Plan, for example, was never finalized because of a minis-
try restructuring which overtook it. Moreover, strategy
implementation is affected by the apartheid legacy which
has not wholly been shaken off. A senior official talked
about 'Inheritance from the apartheid days ... After inde-
pendence the old bureaucrats indoctrinated the new peo-
ple.' Implementation is also affected by the pressure
under which many staff are working. Focus groups which
we conducted with hospital and clinic staff in both the
capital and a district headquarters showed that as well as
heroic dedication, staff are often exhausted and demoral-
ized:
'You get so demotivated because you're doing the same
thing all the time, but have no time to ask patients if they
are really OK. In the old days – five years ago – TB patients
were healthy, just needing medication once a day. Now
they need to be bathed, turned ...'
But having made those qualifications, there are positive
features to be noted. What is arguably more important
than any particular policy document is the sense one gets
of a health service that knows where it is going, and has
been prepared to revise and restructure when necessary to
get there. One senior expatriate commented that 'The
environment here is decisive ... an excellent conduit
through which to roll out programmes.' Another believed
that Namibia's good record 'has to do with governance
and leadership at the higher level ... There is a vision and
it's really used.' The Ministry of Health has restructured
several times, most dramatically just after independence,
but also with the revision of the staff establishment in
1996, and later through a major decentralization to four
regional directorates and thirteen regions, each time in an
attempt to align the health service more closely with gov-
ernment health objectives.
However, Namibia's relatively strong strategic framework
still had one fundamental deficiency. The National Strate-
gic Plan on HIV/AIDS contained no estimate of the current
level of HIV infection, despite being two hundred pages
long and covering every relevant area of government activ-
ity, and, crucially, it stopped short of setting a target for
reducing infection rates, or of showing how its hundreds
of proposed activities would reduce the number of people
who were infected or who would die. In the public man-
agement jargon, those activities were 'outputs' rather than
'outcomes'; means rather than ends [19]. (We hope it is
not pedantic to point out that the Plan incorrectly uses the
word 'outcome' to refer to activities such as increasing
condom use rather than the results that the activities are
designed to obtain.) When only eight months later it did
set the target which the standard format for applications
to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria required [20], it was the modest one of reducing
HIV prevalence among 'younger age groups' by 5% over
the five years of the project – which at best would reduce
overall prevalence from 10% to 9.5% of the population.
The government's reluctance to offer up an ambitious tar-
get as a hostage to fortune is understandable, especially
when it needed to keep a lid on public spending at the
same time (and we will see that the Ministry of Health
could not persuade the government to give it the money
to train the number of enrolled nurses that it believed it
needed). After all, even the much admired New Zealand
government of the late 1990s fought shy of setting out-
come targets. The new Labour government in the UK in its
post-election euphoria did set itself no fewer than 600
such targets, which the responsible minister was prescient
to describe as '600 rods for our own back' at the press
launch in 1999 [19].
But the government's reluctance meant that its actions
would almost certainly not rise to the scale of the prob-
lem. It also meant that the donors, and particularly Amer-
ican donors in whose aid strategies the HIV/AIDS
campaign is a central plank, were in the strange position
of displaying a greater sense of urgency than the govern-Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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ment, and of trying to persuade the government to speed
up its response, even if that entailed cutting across the well
established health strategy. Thus arose the tension
between long-and short-term priorities, including in the
area of HR, to which we have already alluded, and to
which we will return.
HR at government and ministry level
The requirement to advertise almost all vacancies exter-
nally which comes from the government's commitment
to affirmative action (see below), and the deliberate delay
in filling vacancies which results from the overall budget
deficit (7.5% of GDP in 2003/4) are just two examples of
the impact of central government on health staffing. For
as long as governments manage their public servants cen-
trally, for better or worse, tedious restrictions like these
will persist.
At ministry level there was an anachronistic split which no
one in the ministry defended between its departments of
Human Resource Management and Human Resource
Development, with HRM mostly playing the mundane
administrative role of handling leave forms and other HR
housekeeping chores, and HRD dealing with training, but
also taking occasional initiatives such as marketing careers
in health to school and college leavers. To some extent
strategic tasks fell between the two stools, so that a strate-
gic HR response to health policy objectives tended to
come from the overall health policymakers rather than
from the HR function. One informant with experience of
both sides said that 'You will find a HR response to HIV/
AIDS in the HIV/AIDS division, but not in the HR divi-
sion. It's usually driven by the programmes.'
Line manager ownership
Despite central controls, staff management is still rela-
tively decentralized in Namibia. Ministries appoint their
own staff up to and including the permanent secretaries
who are the official heads of ministries, and it is staff at
local level who make the appointments, with HR staff
merely acting as secretaries. Politicians seem to keep out
of staff appointments except, of course, the very senior
ones that only they can make. Even then, their influence
is marked only in 'sensitive' ministries like Defence. Poli-
ticians seem to disagree with their Sri Lankan counterparts
that the only way to get senior officials to implement your
policies is to appoint them yourself. On the other hand,
there is no sense either of Sri Lanka's ideological divide
between politicians and officials [21,26].
The central controls that persist were resented most
fiercely at the sharp end. If a matron resigns in a district, a
senior district officer complained, the request to replace
her has to go first to headquarters, then to Finance and
OPM (despite OPM's claim that these appointments have
been decentralized). Up to three months are lost before
the post can even be advertised. At the lowest level, a local
health centre manager was beyond resentment: 'We just
take what we're given.'
However, at the other end of the system, Finance officials
were surprisingly relaxed about giving more power to
ministries: 'I'm neutral on corruption as between a cen-
tralised and a decentralized system,' said one of them,
who believed that the only way that ministries would ever
learn to manage budgets was by being made to. With a
move to 'programme budgeting' trailed in the finance
minister's 2005 budget speech, it looked likely that minis-
tries would soon have greater freedom – with the notable
exception of pay: previous experience with performance-
related pay suggested that this would create a temptation
that some managers would not be able to resist: 'It
wouldn't be a good thing if accounting officers could
authorize (pay), it would lead to corruption,' according to
a central HR official.
Employee selection
The driving force behind Namibia's employee selection
procedures is affirmative action. As in South Africa,
Namibia's newly independent government inherited a
society with a (white) settler community that was richer
and better educated than the indigenous majority. How-
ever, the South West African People's Organization
(SWAPO) in Namibia espoused non-racialism and had a
small but significant white membership, just like South
Africa's African National Congress (ANC). It wanted to
'redress the racial balance', but it also wanted to abolish
the race discrimination that was apartheid's hateful
essence.
Clearly these two desires were contradictory. The Ministry
of Health's Personnel Procedures Manual defined affirm-
ative action as
'a process whereby action is taken to end unfair discrimi-
nation ... without evoking perceptions of reverse discrim-
ination among certain groups.'
But the Manual also stated that
'Government expects managers to ... consider primarily
disadvantaged persons when they recruit new staff mem-
bers' [27].
It is not clear how 'advantaged persons' could be ruled out
without evoking the perception of reverse discrimination.
To be sure, the government could only change the compo-
sition of the workforce over any politically realistic times-
cale by preferring relatively unqualified black candidates
over white candidates, in a context where whites histori-Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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cally have been better educated than blacks. On the other
hand, doing so drove a coach and horses through the ide-
ology of non-discrimination. Hence the contradiction.
However, Namibian practice was still relatively transpar-
ent. Remarkably and almost uniquely among poor and
rich countries alike, the affirmative action imperative
meant that posts at every level were open to competition
from outside, leading managers to complain that they
could not use discretionary promotion as a way of retain-
ing staff. Affirmative action has also led to explicit proce-
dures, again as in South Africa. There was written guidance
for managers on how to draw up job descriptions, and
managers were expected to keep records of their reasons
for shortlisting and appointing candidates. Rejected can-
didates could appeal, and the appeals procedure had
sharp teeth: appellants were successful in no fewer than
20 of the 25 appeals brought in 2003/4 across govern-
ment as a whole [28].
Strictly speaking, what organizational psychologists call a
'validation study' would be needed to demonstrate that
these elaborate procedures have made a difference to the
quality of staff appointed and the work they do. But expe-
rience elsewhere gives us good reasons to believe that they
will. Apart from that, transparent procedures like these
will tend to increase citizens' confidence in the way gov-
ernment manages its staff on their behalf [28].
Performance management
Following independence a performance management
scheme which included a performance management pay
element was introduced across government as a whole.
Assessment by managers was intensive, taking place once
a quarter. It was possible for good performers to get two
salary increments ('notches') or even three in a single year.
However, the scheme foundered in 1998 in a welter of
accusations of nepotism: 'The old scheme failed because it
was too subjective,' said one informant; 'friends of bosses got
notches' said another. There were also suggestions of what
assessment experts call 'leniency bias' [30]: 'Managers were
giving everyone the notch' because they were 'just afraid to say
no'. The scheme as a whole was seen as 'arbitrary', leading
to complaints from the powerful trade unions. At the time
of our interviews a new 'Performance Management Sys-
tem' was being piloted in the Ministries of Labour and
Agriculture after a lapse of seven years. Significantly, the
emphasis in the new scheme was on competencies; man-
agers would have no power over pay.
Overall, Namibia's performance management experi-
ments have followed a similar trajectory to those in other
developing countries such as Mauritius and Malaysia
[31,32]: the belated introduction of a scheme with a pay
element, intended to introduce the culture of perform-
ance, quickly falling foul of particularistic tendencies in
the broader society, but also of the sheer inability of man-
agers to deal fairly with staff; and the tentative re-introduc-
tion after a cooling-off period of a watered-down scheme
which emphasized employee development rather than
pay, but which still had to prove its worth.
Training and the health 'skills mix'
The context for our discussion of training is the mixed for-
tunes of training in development thinking since the
1960s. In the period between independence and 1990,
improving public staff management, 'capacity building'
[28] and even developing public administration became
all but synonymous with training public employees once
the basic state structures were in place. There were two
principal vehicles for this. The first was the national
administrative staff colleges like INTAN in Malaysia and
MIPAM in Mauritius which newly independent countries
set up to provide pre- and in-service training for their civil
servants. The second was the overseas scholarship pro-
grammes which took up a hefty share of aid agency and
government training budgets. All this activity was based
on a simple 'skills deficit' premise: developing country
governments were seen as underperforming at least in part
because their staff lacked skills, and training was seen as
the way of making up the deficit.
But training has fallen from grace. The training-led model
of public staff management began to decay in the late
1980s, for four reasons. The first was the pressure to
reduce public spending which resulted from the two oil
price shocks of the 1970s; training is notoriously one of
the first spending items which organizations everywhere
cut when they get in trouble. The second reason followed
from the first: the absurdity of training new staff at the
same time as trying to save money by 'downsizing' the
staff that governments already had. The third, insidious
reason was the loss of belief in training as a form of devel-
opment assistance. It had become equated with 'training-
ism': training as an end in itself, serving the vested interest
of training providers and of the trainees who pocketed
what they saved from their training allowances [34].
When the critique was applied to official UK aid spending
on training, it was a convenient pretext for a Conservative
government that was happy to see aid spending decline to
withdraw almost entirely from stand-alone training [35].
Finally, spending less on training was the opportunity cost
of the recognition that training was not the be-all and
end-all of public management: to some extent spending
migrated to support for programme budgeting, 'results
oriented management', performance management and so
on. Those who suggested that training could still be effec-
tive if it was better targeted and more 'strategic' such as
McCourt and Sola [36] were swimming against a powerful
tide.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
Page 8 of 13
(page number not for citation purposes)
The health service in Namibia has bucked this trend. To
understand why, we need first to grasp the concept of
what Buchan and Dal Poz have called the 'skills mix': the
appropriate mixture of skills and jobs that health services
need. For example, they suggest that 'there is unrealized
scope ... for extending the use of nursing staff and for fur-
ther development of care delivery led by nurses/midwives'
at the expense of tasks currently done by doctors [37,8].
Figure 2 shows what Namibia's health staffing hierarchy
looked like at independence.
This structure created two problems. The first was the skill
deficiencies caused by the gaps in the structure. At the
'top', there was no provision for clinical specialization,
and at the 'bottom', auxiliary nurses were mostly
untrained and could not provide specialized care.
Throughout the structure there were staff shortages,
caused by the delay in providing high-skills training, and
also by loss of high-skill staff who were attractive to the
private sector, and likewise by movement from rural to
urban areas.
Figure 3 shows what state the staffing structure was in at
the time of this study, after 15 years of independence.
This structure was the outcome of a large number of sepa-
rate initiatives. The most impressive was probably the
scheme to upgrade auxiliary nurses to enrolled nurses.
Described as a 'milestone' in Namibian health care, it had
its origin in the move to primary health care following
independence, and a 1992 report called Integrated health
care delivery: the challenge of implementation, prepared with
support from WHO. The next step was to recognize that a
system of 'sub-professional' training was the most rele-
vant and affordable way of supporting national primary
health care priorities. Donor support was important, but
once again it supported indigenous plans rather than sub-
stituting for them. An example of this is that the enrolled
nurse training structure was inaugurated with skeleton
staffing before donor resources began to flow. Conse-
quently, donor resources were effective through simply
adding to a structure that already existed, for example by
providing funds for supplementary tutors to be
appointed.
A National Health Training Centre was established in
Windhoek, with four regional centres around the country,
a network described by a donor-funded expatriate as a
'phenomenal resource'. Its courses had been running long
enough at the time of writing for positive results to be evi-
dent. There was a very high training completion rate: 97%
in one regional centre. In at least one northern district,
patient mortality rates improved following enrolled nurse
deployment. Staff themselves were entirely positive about
the scheme, especially the former auxiliary nurses who
were its main beneficiaries: 'It was an eye-opener – we
thought we were doing the correct things.' 'Now we can
manage the clinic alone, there is more responsibility. Sal-
ary-wise, it is better too.' One worker put the advantages
in a homely way: 'You dusted off for the sake of dusting
off, now we know why.' Finally, it was perhaps as positive
a sign as any that private clinics and hospitals were willing
to employ some of the enrolled nurses themselves. With
the fears of better qualified colleagues that the nurses'
short training would not give them the necessary skills
having proved groundless, the enrolled nurses were
becoming an accepted component of the 'skills mix'.
Despite problems such as nurses getting out of their
depth, especially when their managers failed to support
them properly, everyone agreed that this initiative had
been a success.
Figure 2
HIGH-SKILL
Doctors and other health professions (pharmacists etc.) 
Registered nurses 
Auxiliary nurses 
LOW-SKILLHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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Action to improve staffing in the medium term had been
taken at other levels of the staffing hierarchy as well. There
was a programme of pre-medical training to make up for
school-leavers' poor performance in science subjects, and
postgraduate training in clinical specializations such as
obstetrics. Equally important was the six-week pro-
gramme of training for a new cadre of 'community coun-
sellors' who would have time to explain to patients the
ramifications of treatment in a way that doctors and
nurses couldn't do. Following deployment of trained
counsellors, enrolment in Mother to Child Transmission
programmes, designed to prevent mothers from passing
on AIDS to their babies, jumped from 8.5% to 85% of
patients.
Sidestepping the staffing establishment was an element in
the success of both the enrolled nurse and the counsellor
training programmes. The point of a staffing establish-
ment is to keep a lid on spending by making it hard for
ministries to create posts, but it makes it hard to respond
quickly to a new need. This was avoided for the enrolled
nurses by giving trainees the status of students rather than
employees so that they would not be part of the establish-
ment. Similarly, the counselling scheme was managed by
the Red Cross, and counsellors were formally Red Cross
(not government) employees.
Altering the 'skills mix' by lowering the fences between the
traditional health professions is an example of what has
been called 'functional flexibility' in the context of the
new SHRM model. It is supported by evidence that using
nurses and care assistants to do what has traditionally
been doctors' and nurses' work is not at the expense of
quality of care [37].
These changes aligned staffing much more closely with
the health priorities of the new government. This, we sug-
gest, is an example of the Mintzbergian 'strategic thinking'
model of strategy rather than the blueprint model (see
also Peters and Waterman [38]). What was crucial was the
shared understanding about the reorientation of the
health system that would be needed to move away from
apartheid provision and towards provision for all
Namibia's citizens, and from curative-based to preventa-
tive medicine, with all that this reorientation entailed for
HR. This again was a result of the focusing of minds that
came with the liberation struggle. Without it, the health
service would have been like an anthill when the Queen
has been removed, and no strategy document, however
elaborate, would have been a substitute.
Discussion: HR and the health crisis
Characterizing HRM in the Namibian health service
The study results provide a picture of a health service
where at the strategic level there is a relatively strong stra-
tegic framework, but where key strategic challenges, nota-
bly the challenge of HIV/AIDS, have been fudged, since
strategic aspirations have only partially been translated
into operational objectives. This is a major weakness. The
premise on which this article is based – and equally on
which the journal in which it appears was founded – is
that the human resource is a major but neglected means
Figure 3
HIGH-SKILL Clinical specialists (paediatricians etc.)
Doctors and other health professions (pharmacists, etc.) 
(Pre-medical training) 
Registered nurses 
Enrolled nurses (upgraded ‘auxiliary nurses’) and other 
‘sub-professionals’
LOW-SKILL Lay counsellors Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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of improving the health of the citizens of poor countries.
That in turn requires HR to be aligned with the health
challenges that countries face. On any reckoning, the fight
against HIV/AIDS, and also TB, are major challenges, yet
staffing strategy in Namibia has only partly addressed
them.
At the operational level the picture is mixed. The govern-
ment's steady post-independence determination to move
from a curative to a preventative orientation is reflected in
the 'phenomenal' network of training institutes, and in
some imaginative and flexible training provision which
managed to circumvent the government's monolithic
staffing structure. Similarly, the government's consistent
commitment to affirmative action means that employee
selection is relatively sophisticated, not only in profes-
sional HR terms but in terms of 'voice', through a strong
appeals procedure which provides vital feedback on the
quality of selection decisions (albeit feedback that indi-
vidual managers might prefer not to have). Conversely,
efforts to manage staff performance have ground to a halt,
stymied by particularistic tendencies in the wider society
and by the partly related opposition of the powerful trade
unions. However, these mixed results do have one over-
arching factor in common: they are all alike grounded in
indigenous factors of political economy. In the case of the
government's commitment to preventative care and
affirmative action, those factors have a positive effect on
HRM; in the case of the particularistic tendencies and the
strength of the trade unions, the effect is negative.
Strategy, urgency and commitment
At the start of this article we noted how the Millennium
Development Goals represent a new departure in develop-
ment thinking, and how public staff management has
come to be seen as central to realizing them, especially in
health. This article has explored what that means in prac-
tice for one sub-Saharan country in Africa. Namibia has
patiently built up a strategic framework for health policy
in the context of government policy as a whole, including
strong training arrangements at every level of health staff-
ing, and it has brought HIV/AIDS under the strategic
umbrella through its National Strategic Plan for HIV/
AIDS. The framework is imperfect, but expatriates who
know other African countries agreed that it works rela-
tively well. Its major weakness is that it has not kept pace
with the rise in HIV/AIDS and TB infection: the commu-
nity counselling service, still at the pilot stage at the time
of this study, was the only specific response. That is the
source of the tension between building long-term capacity
in a strategic context and responding to the short-term
demands of the AIDS and TB crisis.
In a way the tension ought to be a false one, for the crisis
has not come out of a clear blue sky: it was as long ago as
1986 that Namibia's first four cases of AIDS were identi-
fied. Strategic management is by definition a long-term
activity, but the period over which AIDS and the associ-
ated rise in TB infection have developed comfortably
crosses the strategic time threshold. AIDS and TB have
become an urgent issue because it is only very recently
that governments in southern Africa, including
Namibia's, have begun to follow Uganda's example in
being candid with their citizens and then acting decisively
(Uganda was the ultimate model for Namibia's counsel-
ling programme). As a result, infection rates have been
allowed to creep upwards. In Uganda, the percentage of
pregnant women attending antenatal clinics who were
HIV positive went down from 31% to 14% between 1992
and 1998. In Namibia, it went up from 4.2% to 17.4%
over the same period, and by 2002 it had risen further to
22% – and this in a country that is much richer than
Uganda, showing that lack of money is only part of the
story.
The dilemma that Namibia was facing at the time of writ-
ing, in its overall health strategy as well as in the HR
approach which is a particular manifestation of that strat-
egy, was to find an adequate response to the particular
problems of HIV/AIDS and TB without damaging the stra-
tegic framework that it had taken so much trouble to set
up. On the one hand, policies have succeeded in Namibia
as much because of the framework in which they are set as
because of the policies themselves. Namibia's health strat-
egy experience shows the futility of 'cherry-picking' indi-
vidual practices out of the framework in which they have
arisen, even when they are targeted at very urgent health
problems like AIDS. On the other hand, the very solidity
of that framework has militated against responding to a
pandemic which has no respect for strategic timetables.
The picture is complicated by the government's emphasis
on the framework being in conflict with donors' emphasis
on the problems.
Fundamentally, we suggest, this is a problem of political
commitment. It is significant that WHO [39] believes that
the crucial factor in Uganda's success was political com-
mitment. The global report of UNAIDS [12] calls for
'strong leadership and concrete commitment from all sec-
tors of government and society', and it may be equally sig-
nificant that a whole section is devoted to the same topic
in Namibia's AIDS Strategy document. If we apply the
model of political commitment developed by McCourt
[40], we can see that the 'antecedents' of commitment in
the form of political and administrative capacity are
present, but that the 'elements' are defective in one impor-
tant way. While Namibia's commitment to tackling the
pandemics is voluntary, explicit and public, it is not suffi-
ciently challenging in that, as we saw, no target has been
set for reducing the scale of infection.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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It is outside the scope of this article to address the politics
that must underpin any public staffing initiative (see
Alarkoubi and McCourt [41]). However, the World Bank
[42] has noted in its Public Expenditure Management Hand-
book that 'In many respects, political will is a function of
the quality of advice provided to politicians'. Officials
need to show politicians that there is a target for reducing
infection rates which it would be realistic to set. That in
turn will mean showing that the resources are in place to
meet the target. This applies across the strategic board, as
it were, but it applies acutely in HR, for while attention
has focused on access to drugs like Anti-Retrovirals, the
human resource will also be needed to administer those
drugs.
Relationship with donors
The relationship with donors, touched on in the last sec-
tion, is a necessary factor in our discussion. As a relatively
wealthy country, Namibia does not rely heavily on
donors, who in 2003 provided only 3.4% of GDP (com-
pared to 13.1% in Tanzania). Partly for this reason,
Namibia has been successful in ensuring that donors sup-
port indigenous priorities: 'When you're not aid-depend-
ent, you can stay in charge.' High-level meetings with
donors were chaired by the minister, and donor proposals
were worked on intensively within the ministry at the
planning stage, so that pressure to import pet schemes
which donors have implemented in other countries was
resisted. Despite this, the Namibian side still had to assert
itself from time to time. This was especially true, it
appeared, in dealing with American donors, who 'can be
quite hard to keep under control', having domestically
generated objectives of their own which cut across the
Ministry's – including, one senior official claimed, a pref-
erence for expensive drugs manufactured by American
companies rather than generic substitutes. (It may be rel-
evant that during the writing of this article the US Ambas-
sador to the United Nations was pressing to have the
following phrase deleted from the draft of a United
Nations summit agreement: 'encourage pharmaceutical
companies to make anti-retroviral drugs affordable and
accessible in Africa' [43].)
From an outside perspective, Namibia sometimes seemed
too ready to resent donors suggesting models from other
countries. But it is in keeping with an emphasis on indig-
enous ownership of staff management initiatives, and
there was concrete evidence of its value. The Ministry of
Health has used its position of strength to face down
donors' preference for freestanding projects and to har-
ness their support to recruiting more staff and training
more health workers than they would otherwise have
been able to do. One example was the 'parallel hiring
scheme' run by the American CDC with support from
USAID, where additional staff were appointed on the
standard ministry terms. At the time of writing 13 doctors,
10 nurses, 10 pharmacists and 10 data clerks had been
recruited, and there was approval to go up to 27, 15, 15
and 15 respectively. Similarly, funding from CDC made it
possible for the number of nurses trained to increase dra-
matically from the 50 that the Ministry of Education was
prepared to fund to around the 200 that the Ministry
believed it needed to train: 'CDC bridged the gap.'
This style of support incurred a minimum transaction cost
in money, time and expertise, because the government's
administrative structures already existed. It should not be
a surprise that Ministry staff seemed to appreciate it more
than any other kind of donor assistance.
Conclusion: towards a new HR paradigm
In this concluding section we discuss, finally, what HR
action should be a priority, both in Namibia and in other
countries. The fundamental strategic need is to estimate
the staffing that will be needed to scale up AIDS and TB
provision and move towards the MDGs. This is a need
that Namibia has only partly addressed. Assuming more
ambitious targets than the current ones for reducing infec-
tion rates, there should first be an estimate of how far the
current staffing paradigm can be extended; in other words,
how much scope there is to fill more vacancies through
additional funding from central government and donors,
as has already been done.
However, it seems clear that even with the extra funds that
were scheduled to come from the Global Fund, debt relief
and other initiatives, countries like Namibia will need a
radically different staffing paradigm if they are to go
beyond sheer wishful thinking or the fudged response that
Namibia has made up to now. We saw that Botswana esti-
mated that it would need, among other things, 179%
more pharmacists to administer ART. But this was a
mechanical and completely unrealistic extrapolation from
current arrangements: there are just not enough pharma-
cists to go round.
What shape might a new paradigm take? It would have to
come from within the health system, where both the nec-
essary knowledge and the basic ownership of the problem
reside. However, we may be able to perceive the shape of
a solution from what we know already. First, it must be
accommodated within the basic strategic framework
which has been built up over 15 years and should not be
destabilized. Second, it should target middle and lower
levels in the staffing hierarchy. We know that African
countries are finding it hard to recruit and retain the
highly qualified staff whose training is so time-consuming
and expensive. We also know that the experience of using
what Dovlo has called 'mid-level cadres' to substitute for
those staff is positive. Therefore it seems appropriate toHuman Resources for Health 2007, 5:1 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/1
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use job analysis and competence development to identify
the precise skills that the new treatments will require, and
to provide them to trainees at the lowest possible level,
equivalent to Namibia's enrolled nurses and community
counsellors. There is in every African country a large pool
of unemployed people, notably recent school leavers,
who have only basic qualifications. They can be trained
quickly and cheaply, their training will not be sophisti-
cated enough for other countries to want to poach them,
and they are more likely to have roots in rural and poor
areas that will make them want to stay there. There are
probably also existing staff like Namibia's auxiliary nurses
whose skills can be upgraded. There may also be public
employees in low priority areas who can be retrained and
redeployed.
Namibia's experience shows that such trainees need pro-
fessional support and supervision. Staff at higher levels
will need to take extra supervisory duties. 137 health staff
had successfully completed Certificates in Management
up to the time of writing in Namibia. However, the more
urgent need is for short, intensive development pro-
grammes that will provide management skills that can be
used immediately. It is very desirable that there is a per-
formance management framework within which those
skills can be used.
This study concludes with the possibility of a new para-
digm for HR in governments like Namibia's which need to
respond to the health crisis, and to move towards the
MDGs to which most governments have committed
themselves. It is absolutely in keeping with what we know
about strategic management that a new strategic direction
will mean a new approach to HR (and also to public man-
agement in general). It will include the elements that this
study has focused on: a strategic framework, since govern-
ments should proceed from a strategic sense of overall HR
needs in the light of national policy objectives; line man-
ager ownership, since lower level and relatively unquali-
fied staff will have greater supervision needs; good
employee selection to identify candidates who may lack
normal qualification badges of achievement but who
have some relevant skills and the potential to acquire
more; and a system of performance management for man-
agers to supervise and support these new staff. But it is
likely to give pride of place to the deployment and pre-
service training of middle- and lower-level health workers:
training, which has been out of fashion for 15 years in
development management, regains the importance it had
in the early independence period. There is also room for
creativity in organizational arrangements: Namibia's del-
egation of its counselling scheme to an NGO, the Red
Cross, may be a straw in the wind.
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